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Contrary to Anthony Smith’s view that national myth-makers derive meaning primarily 
from a nation’s own positive ‘useable past’, this article argues that the globalization and 
universalisation of the Jewish Holocaust has created new poles of identity for ethno-
nationalists, existing outside ‘authentic’ local conceptions of history and culture. Also 
contrary to Smith’s view of a positive golden age at the root of national mythology, I 
argue that negative imagery can play an equally if not more significant role in some 
examples of nationalism. In Serbia, viewing the self through the lens of a persecuted 
victim became crucial during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. As a new 
‘strategic site’, the Holocaust functioned as a template for re-interpreting ‘self’ and 
‘other’, while re-ordering history. A ‘Jewish trope’ emerged in popular discourse to 
legitimate the violent re-creation of national space. As Živković has argued: ‘Both Serbs 
and Jews are the ‘chosen peoples’—slaughtered, sacrificed, denied expression, yet always 
righteous, always defending themselves, never attacking’ (Živković 2000, 73). In 
promoting this view of Serbian history, both local and Diaspora nationalists were 
involved. 
 
Smith and the Useable Past 
This article problematises the work of Anthony David Smith, arguably one of the world’s 
best known theorists of nationalism. Smith’s work is located in the ‘ethno-symbolist’ 
school which he, Hutchinson, Armstrong, and others styled as a species of bridge 
between Primordialism and the later and more popular Modernist school (Ozkirimli 2000; 
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Smith 1998). I have chosen to look at Smith because of his school’s interest in nationalist 
mythology and imagery. Modernists, such as Gellner, Breuilly, Hobsbawm and Anderson 
attach little importance to national myth. Gellner, after all, famously argued that ‘[t]he 
cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions. 
Any old shred and patch would have served as well’ (Gellner 2000, 56; Breuilly 1985, 
30) 
 
Anderson has completely dismissed the importance of negative imagery throughout the 
process of national development and ‘democratisation’. While he posits that ‘nations 
inspire love, and often profoundly self sacrificing love,’ inspiring such positive legacies 
as ‘poetry, prose fiction, music and plastic arts ... how truly rare it is to find analogous 
nationalist products expressing fear and loathing’ (Anderson 1987, 141). Anderson even 
advances that colonised people felt little hatred for their former colonial overlords. He 
was astonished at ‘how insignificant the element of hatred is in these expressions of 
national feeling’ (141-142). Despite Anderson’s musings, not all nations focus 
exclusively on love, and like Smith, Anderson commits the fallacy of deriving general 
rules from select examples, in this case, examples from South East Asia.  
 
Authenticity and the Golden Age 
In his analysis of ethnic and national myths, Smith had privileged two arguments, which I 
will later question, using examples from Serbia. The first is the idea that the local or 
‘authentic’ forms the very heart of national myth, while foreign or alien ideas are 
rigorously purged from the early proto-nation during its development. The second 
advances that nationalist mythology is fundamentally positive and inspirational, dealing 
with heroic and ennobling époques—what Smith has termed the golden age.  
 
Arguably, Smith’s main contribution to the discipline of nationalism studies, and hence to 
international relations, is his privileging of the ‘ethnie’, which he first popularised in 
1986 as ‘named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, 
having an association with specific territory, and a sense of solidarity’ (Smith 1998, 191). 
Not all ethnie become nations, but most nations are derived from ethnie, particularly 
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’ethnic cores’ that have the requisite characteristics to absorb and assimilate other ethnie, 
making them part of an emerging nation. Unlike the nations they may later become, core 
ethnie need to selectively borrow elements from other foreign groups through ‘controlled 
culture contact’ (Smith 1990, 35-39). This allows the ethnie to become vibrant, 
introducing new and diverse elements into the group’s identity. As the ethnic core 
expands and absorbs other ethnie, it incorporates their elements within its growing ethnic 
(and ultimately proto-national) culture.  
 
However, once the ethnic core forms a coherent nation (with a national homeland, a 
unified economy and unified myths and symbols) (Smith 1990, 40, 64-65), foreign 
elements and cultural borrowings can be perceived as a threat to the authenticity and 
purity of the nation. Diversity is abandoned in favour of a more unified identity, and a 
process of purging and exclusion begins. For Smith, nations are based on ‘an ideal of 
authenticity which presupposes a unique culture-community, with a distinct and original 
character’. Each nation possesses its own ‘peculiar historic “genius”’ which the 
nationalists are tasked with rediscovering and possessing (Smith 2001, 442; see also 
Smith 1998, 194). A nation’s view of the world must be both ‘culturally distinct’ and 
‘rooted’. Clear-cut territorial boundaries need to be established, and a ‘keen eye’ is 
required to determine the identity of ‘“alien” objects throughout trade and exchange, as 
well as for successive migrations, invasions and colonisation.’ Throughout, images of 
cultural purity, of ‘distinctiveness’, ‘originality’, of what is ‘“our very own” and nobody 
else’s’, form a crucial part of identity construction (442-443). 
 
The key to the nation’s survival and popularity for Smith is its golden age mythology 
(Smith 1979, 26). A nation must be able to ‘unfold a glorious past, a golden age of saints 
and heroes, to give meaning to its promise of restoration and dignity’ (Smith 1983, 153-
154). Nationalism creates secular heroes, saints, and great leaders, allowing co-nationals 
to dream of a glorious destiny, based on the ‘model and guide’ of the golden age. 
Similarly, ‘the more glorious that antiquity appears, the easier it becomes to mobilise the 
people around a common culture’ (Smith 1996b, 39, 57). Revisiting and re-presenting the 
past as one of glory, heroism and happiness inspires national members, and unites them 
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for collective action (Smith 1990, 14). In what Smith calls ‘the myth of the historical 
renovation,’ nationalist leaders attempt to recapture the nation’s golden past, to return to a 
basic national ‘essence’, a ‘basic pattern of living and being’ (22). Golden ages are 
replete with ‘poetic spaces’, ‘nature’, as well as ‘vivid recreations of the glorious past of 
the community’ (65-66, see also Smith 1996b, 37).  
 
For Smith, local history and identity are crucial elements in the construction of national 
myth. The communal past of a nation forms a ‘repository or quarry from which materials 
may be selected in the construction and invention of nations’ (Smith 1996b, 37). History 
is fragmented into diverse elements which become collectively a ‘useable past’, wherein 
nationalists choose the myths they need in order to rally people together to reclaim 
national greatness (37). Different elements may be chosen at different times to suit the era 
and the state of the nation. Heroic myths may be chosen in times of defeat, while myths 
of peace and reconciliation may be chosen in times of war (37). Nevertheless, the key 
element is that such myths belong properly to the nation. They are rooted in the nation’s 
own past, not someone else’s. 
 
Smith does argue that at first, foreign elements were incorporated into the nation through 
Greek and Roman classicalism. In nineteenth century Europe, recasting the nation to 
reflect the ideals of Periclean Athens became ‘the standard and model for subsequent 
ideals of the golden age in other periods and civilizations.’ A broadening of the classical 
ideal occurred somewhat later to encompass ancient Persia, Egypt, Mesopotamia, etc 
(Smith 1996b, 37; see also Smith 1996a, 181). However, as modernisation spread, and 
most budding nations sought to find their own golden ages, ‘the true golden age had to be 
located in the pasts of the ethnic community or nation and it had to be a heroic age which 
could dignify the nation to be’ (41).  
 
The local and the positive are both crucial to Smith’s golden age. After all, its five 
functions buttress such ideas. It is meant to ‘satisfy the quest for authenticity’; to 
‘establish and delineate the “true self”, the authentic being of the collectivity’, while 
similarly locating and ‘re-rooting’ the community. Additionally, the golden age 
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establishes continuity between generations, reminds co-nationals of past greatness and 
their own ‘inner worth’, while also pointing towards a ‘glorious destiny’ (Smith 1996b, 
48-51). Archaeology further also allows nationalists to ‘locate “ourselves” and dignify 
“our communities” by reference to an ancient pedigree and time-honoured environment’ 
(Smith 1996a, 180-181). And for Smith, myths can only change so much. Changes when 
they do take place occur only ‘within the boundaries of the nation’. He adds: 
 
[T]his ‘nation-building’ activity operates within a definite tradition; it is not made over 
entirely anew by each generation, but inherits the mythologies and symbolisms of 
previous generations. A new generation may come to reject the interpretations of the 
predecessor, and question its values, myths and symbols, forsaking its holy sites for new 
ones and replacing its golden ages and heroes by others; but all this question and 
replacement is carried on within definite emotional and intellectual confines, which 
constitute far more powerful and durable barriers to the outside than any physical 
boundaries. This is because a social magnetism and psychological charge attaches to the 
‘myth-symbol complexes’ of particular ethnie which in turn form the basis of a nation’s 
core heritage (Smith 1996a, 206-207). 
 
Thus while some things may change, the basic character of the nation does not, and 
nationalists, whether consciously or not, operate within proscribed boundaries set by their 
forefathers.  
 
The role of Negative Imagery  
For Smith, nationalism is primarily a positive phenomenon, ‘lifting present generations 
out of their banal reality’ (Smith 1983, 154). Smith’s general position on the use of 
Holocaust imagery and negative imagery is to dismiss it. While he has argued for the 
importance of warfare as an important ‘mobiliser of ethnic sentiments’, and as a ‘provider 
of myths and memories for future generations’, he has also concluded that ‘it would be an 
exaggeration to deduce the sense of common ethnicity from the fear of the “outsider” and 
paired antagonisms’ (Smith 1990, 27). As for negative myths in the nation’s past, ‘the 
period of decline is regarded as “unnatural”, a matter of “betrayal” from within, or 
“subjugation” and decay from without’. National history is meant to be linear, 
progressing towards a positive endpoint (Smith 1996a, 191). In his discussion of ‘anti-
colonialism’, Smith has dismissed any sort of fear or loathing of others. ‘Men’, he writes, 
‘do not seek collective independence and build states simply to react to a “common 
enemy”’ (Smith 1983, 65-68). In his taxonomy of groups (tribe, ethnie, and nation) Smith 
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includes ‘In-group sentiment’, but excludes any mention of how fear or loathing of the 
outgroup could also be important (189).  
 
Again, this is primarily because national myths are meant to promote nostalgia for the 
past, a simpler, better time in the nation’s past. The alienation, the anomie, the feelings of 
‘estrangement and homelessness’ brought on by modernity and industrialisation are 
mitigated through a return to national ‘roots’—a ‘satisfying social framework’ and a 
‘surrogate religion’ (Smith 1996a, 174-176). Everything about national history needs to 
be positive and glowing (200). A reading of Smith’s work thus reveals that local, 
positive, forms of imagery are seen to be crucial to the formation of nations and 
nationalism. The question arises then as to the role of negative imagery and foreign or 
external elements and history. For Smith, both seem to be relatively unimportant. This 
paper seeks to claim otherwise, through an examination of national identity in late 
twentieth century Serbia.  
 
Negative Mythology and the Holocaust 
As we shall later see, Serbian nationalism in the 1980s and 90s relied on a series of heroic 
myths of the golden age. However, these myths were not wholly positive, containing 
elements of defeat, suffering and national tragedy. As well, nationalists having recourse 
to this golden age brought in inauthentic or foreign Holocaust and Jewish imagery, 
seemingly to strengthen the appeal of nationalism. Why any nation would wish to do this 
falls squarely outside of Smith’s theoretical framework. In Nationalism and Modernity 
(1998) Smith purposely excludes discussion of genocide, ethnic cleansing, national 
minorities and several other current topics, first, in order to save space, and second and 
more importantly, because ‘it is by no means clear that they can further the task of 
explaining the origins, development and nature of nations and nationalism’ (Smith 1998, 
xiii). This, I would argue, ignores an important aspect of nationalist mythology that has 
emerged since the mid-1980s, not only in Serbia, but around the world. Smith’s 
privileging of the local and positive as the only sites of ‘authentic’ meaning need to be 
carefully examined and problematised.  
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Smith’s ideal of a positive golden age as the crucial lynchpin of nationalism has been 
contested. Many theorists approach negative myths differently, seeing these elements as 
crucial to national development and consolidation (MacDonald 2003, Chapter 2). Trevor-
Roper’s ‘normal nationalism’ included a sense of persecution and danger, comprising 
such things as ‘great national defeat’, and ‘danger of being swamped by foreigners’ 
(Trevor-Roper 1962, 12). For Alter, ‘social groups also tend to define their national 
identity and national consciousness in negative terms ...’ (Alter 1992, 7,19). Kecmanović 
has operationalised ‘Counteridentification’ and ‘pseudospeciation’, both of which deal 
with the centrality of enemies and negative myths in a nation’s past (Kecmanović 1996, 
36). One sees similar perspectives in the work of Claude Lefort, Marc Howard Ross, and 
Michael Ignatieff.1  
 
Both Schöpflin and Kecmanović have created useful ‘taxonomies’ or classifications of 
negative myths which counter Smith’s ideal of a positive golden age. Schöpflin’s work 
includes ‘myths of powerlessness and compensation for the powerless’—stressing the 
importance of justice and status reversal for those who have been wronged in the past 
(Schöpflin 1996, 29). A second type, ‘myths of unjust treatment’, advance that ‘history is 
a malign and unjust actor that has singled out the community for special, negative 
treatment’ (29-30). Schöpflin has stressed the purposeful nature of collective suffering, 
endowing persecution and victimisation with meaning. The world ‘owes’ such nations—
they have ‘suffered a special debt … the victims of suffering are helpless because they 
suffered for the wider world and the wider world should recognise this, thereby 
legitimating the group’s special worth’ (29-30). He has placed Holocaust myths here, as 
well as myths which copy the Holocaust, appropriating its symbolism (30-31).  
 
 
                                                
Kecmanović’s myths include such themes as ‘damage’, which highlight the historic 
deprivation of the nation at the hands of antagonists (Kecmanović 1996, 61-63). As with 
 
1 Discussed in Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin, “Television and National/Public Memory’, in James Gow, Richard 
Paterson, and Alison Preston (eds), Bosnia By Television (London: British Film Institute, 1996) pp. 63-4. 
Marc Howard Ross, “Psychocultural Interpretation Theory and Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflicts’, Political 
Psychology, 16:3 (1995) p. 533. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New 
Nationalism (Toronto: Viking Books, 1993) p. 14. Minogue’s three stage process of nationalist awakening 
similarly includes a crucial “struggle” phase where the nation must confront and fight against its enemies. 
Kenneth R. Minogue, Nationalism (London: B.A. Batsford, 1967) pp. 25-8. 
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Schöpflin, themes of ‘victim and sacrifice’ are important, where nationalists believe 
themselves to be ‘victims of envy, of the hegemonic and expansionist tendencies of other 
people, victims of minority or majority groups that continuously demand greater 
autonomy or more rights’ (66-67). At a general level, the above theorists have noted the 
importance of negative forms of identification as a means of rallying co-nationals 
together. Such views challenge Smith’s theories that members of the nation rely primarily 
on national history for inspiration and a sense of positive belonging. They propose that 
fear, anger, resentment, insecurity and defeat also form crucial aspects of national 
imagining.  
 
At a more specific level, the Holocaust has played a crucial role in re-presenting national 
history. As a stock series of metaphors, images, and symbols for good and evil, righteous 
and demonic, the Holocaust has become increasingly influential in structuring and 
rescripting nationalist narratives, especially since the 1970s and 80s, when the Holocaust 
arguably became ‘industrialised’ (Finkelstein 2000). I will argue that, contrary to Smith’s 
view of authentic, local and positive myths comprising national mythology, Holocaust 
imagery has formed its own generalized ‘useable past’ that can be used for Serbs, and 
indeed any other group seeking to advance itself. As Finkielkraut has observed in many 
very different cases:  
 
Nazism is invoked almost religiously to represent civilization’s Other ... Since Hitler’s 
time, every villain is a fascist, and every victim wears the yellow star. There is no 
revolution, no revolt, no struggle, no matter how minor its object, that fails to go 
rummaging through the past only to end up presenting itself in terms of this particular 
period of history. ... Antifascism had established the Jews as value: as the gold standard 
of oppression, as the paradigm of the victim (Finkielkraut 1998, 99-100) 
 
Arguably, the Holocaust has achieved a pre-eminence unequalled by any other genocide 
in history. As Goldstone notes: ‘No other genocide has evoked this response from the 
international academic community’ (Goldstone 2001, 42). For Rubenstein: ‘Few events 
of the twentieth century have been the object of as much persistent and popular 
interest…’ (Rubenstein 2001, 33), while Novick describes ‘a flood of books, films, 
university courses, and docudramas … invoked as reference point in discussions of 
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everything from AIDS to abortion’ (Novick 1994, 159; see also Levin 1993, 197; Sydnor 
1993, 74).  
 
Stemming from the idea that the Holocaust has been successfully commemorated or even 
‘industrialized’ has emerged a debate about whether the Holocaust can be compared to 
other tragedies, and more specifically, whether or not the word ‘holocaust’ itself should 
be borrowed by other groups seeking to commemorate their own histories of 
victimization. Generally speaking, there are three main schools of thought on the subject, 
classified by Rosenberg as ‘absolutists’, ‘relativists’ and ‘trivialists’ (Rosenberg 2000, 
150-151). 
 
The absolutist school stands solidly against any ‘inappropriate’ use of the term, relativists 
favour qualified comparisons, while trivialists advocate the application of the term and its 
associated imagery to a wide variety of contexts. The absolutists use terms such as 
‘hijacking’; ‘grotesque competition in suffering’; a ‘growing lapse of memory’; ‘facile 
Holocaust victimology’; and ‘word-napping’ to describe the ‘borrowing’ of Holocaust 
imagery and vocabulary (Finkielkraut 1998, 59; Landau 1998, 3-5; Huyssen 1994, 13; 
Rosenbaum 2001, 13-14). Such ‘absolutist’ views, Rosenberg argues, negate the very 
idea that the Holocaust can be compared to anything that preceded or followed it 
(Rosenberg 2000, 150-151). Allied to this group are what I have termed ‘hard relativists’, 
who compare the Holocaust with other tragedies, but largely to promote the Holocaust’s 
unique and unprecedented nature (Katz, Bauer and Melson are good examples here) 
(Katz 2000, 21, 26; Bauer 2001, 10-11, 12; Roth 2000, 155; Melson 1992, 26-27, 29).  
 
Some historians, however, see Holocaust comparison and borrowing as inevitable. 
Moshman argues that since our contemporary understanding of genocide is based on the 
Holocaust, we have little choice but to invoke this ‘prototype’ as a symbol for 
comparison (Moshman 2001, 432, 444-448). For Flanzbaum, the Holocaust has attained a 
‘cult-like status … augmented by its use as a touchstone of victimization’ (quoted in 
Moshman 2001, 447), while Berenbaum finds in comparison a way of ‘deepen[ing] our 
moral sensitivity while sharpening our perception … [displaying] generosity of spirit and 
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ethical integrity’ (Berenbaum 1990, 34). Charny defends the right of groups to compare 
their suffering with the Holocaust (Stannard 2001, 192), while Novick accuses those who 
promote Holocaust uniqueness of ‘gerrymandering’, and ‘an intellectual sleight of hand’ 
(Novick 1994, 9).  
 
The third position promotes Holocaust comparison and extensive borrowing, advancing 
that ‘holocaust’ can validly be used to describe a wide variety of tragedies. Here, the 
Holocaust becomes a generalized, universalized form of evil that can be applied to many 
different contexts and situations. It becomes a generic ‘useable past’ that any group can 
use to advance itself. For Rosenberg, these ‘trivialists’ are ‘quite willing to see the 
Holocaust as an event of major importance, but they nevertheless agree that the claim of 
uniqueness cannot be sustained in any non-trivial form’ (Rosenberg 2000, 150). For 
Stannard, (a ‘trivialist’ par excellence), while the Holocaust (with a capital ‘H’) ‘clearly 
applies exclusively to the genocide that was perpetrated by the Nazis against their various 
victims’, holocaust with a lower-case ‘h’ should ‘belong to anyone who cares to use it’ 
(Stannard 2001, 272-273). Others like Chicago have universalised the Holocaust as ‘a 
window into an aspect of the unarticulated but universal human experience of 
victimization’, as well as a ‘bridge towards the creation of “a new global community 
based on human shared values”’ (discussed in Langer 1998, 12). 
 
Serbia and the Rise of Nationalism 
As will hopefully become apparent in the second half of this article, while Serbs had 
recourse to positive, local golden ages, the primary focus of Serbian mythmaking during 
and after the collapse of Yugoslavia was on negative events in the life of the nation, 
featuring images of persecution and genocide. In this, Jewish Holocaust imagery played a 
key role.  
 
Throughout the conflict, the myth of the Battle of Kosovo was touted as a key moniker of 
Serbian identity, figuring as the locus of a historic defeat, but also the awakening of 
Serbian values and spirituality. In legend, Serbian Prince Lazar was handed an ultimatum, 
where he was either to pay homage to the Ottoman Sultan Murad I, relinquishing control 
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of Serbian lands and taxation, or bring his forces to Kosovo Polje to face the Sultan’s 
army. Lazar was later approached in a dream by a grey hawk (or falcon) flying from 
Jerusalem, and was offered a choice: an earthly kingdom (implying victory for his forces 
against the Sultan), or a heavenly kingdom, (where the Serbs would be defeated in battle 
but become a divine and chosen people) (Hall 1994, 235-290). The details of the battle 
are sketchy, including the identity of the actual winners and losers (Kaplan1993, 35-36; 
Marriott 1930, 65; Judah 1997, 31; Malcolm 1998, 75-79). However, in legend, the Serbs 
lost, and were thereafter subject to five centuries of Ottoman rule. What has emerged 
most prominently, however, was the heroism of the Serbs, dying so that their nation could 
be elevated as a spiritual entity (Velimirovich, Nickolai and Popovich 1996). 
 
The nineteenth century development of the myth through linguist Vuk Karadžić 
transformed Lazar into a Christ-like figure—who led the Serbian nation to holy 
martyrdom so that it would achieve divine status. As well, Lazar’s enemies became 
Judas-like traitors (Sells 1996, 31; Judah 1997, 36). Kosovo and its lessons would be 
developed further through such works as ‘The Mountain Wreath’, by Petar Petrović-
Njegoš (a price-bishop from Montenegro), and geographer Jovan Cvijić’s writings on his 
‘Dinaric man’—the archetypal Serb, ‘consumed with a burning desire to avenge Kosovo 
… and to revive the Serbian empire about which he has never ceased to dream…’ (Judah 
1997, 62-63, 65-66).  
 
In many respects, Kosovo does function as a golden age myth in the Smithean sense. It 
provides heroes, villains, stimulating action, ennobling virtues, and elevates the nation to 
a holy and chosen entity. Yet it is profoundly negative. The Serbian people are victims of 
Turkish control for 500 years, their autonomy crushed until the nineteenth century. 
Traitors abound within their own camp, especially those who convert to Islam. Certainly 
the pull of Kosovo on its own was immensely powerful. Celebrations for the 600th 
anniversary of the Battle in 1989 drew enormous crowds, as Kosovo fever gripped the 
population. The relics of Prince Lazar were paraded around Serbia, with full media 
coverage. The official celebrations helped to seal Milošević’s own growing personality 
cult. (Jacobsen 1996, 48; Vulliamy 1994, 51-52; see also Glenny 1993, 33-36). 
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Yet in many respects, Kosovo itself was not enough, and the 1980s would also herald the 
introduction of specifically Jewish imagery into emerging conceptions of the Serbian 
nation. This foreign imagery was certainly similar in style to Kosovo victim myths. There 
was certainly no shortage of feeling that Serbs were righteous and chosen victims. Yet 
Holocaust imagery pushed the envelope, allowing Serbian nationalist goals to gain wider, 
more universal appeal. It could resonate with domestic Serbs and those in the Diaspora, 
as well as with Jews and non-Jews. The 1980s would inaugurate what Živković has called 
the ‘Jewish trope’ in Serbian national identity, where myths of Serbian and Jewish 
suffering were interwoven, providing a new series of national myths. (Živković  2000, 69-
73).  
 
Serbian nationalism in the 1980s was largely a reaction to rise of nationalism amongst 
Kosovar Albanians in the former Serbian province of Kosovo. Demands for autonomy 
spurred a crackdown on dissent and a fear of Albanian secession in Serbia’s heartland 
(Pavković 1996, 78). While Albanians constituted 90 per cent of the population, Kosovo 
was also the seat of the early Orthodox Church and many of its best-loved buildings, 
while Kosovo Polje was the scene of the Serbs’ epic battle against the Ottoman Empire in 
1389 (Judah 1997, 21-22). The use of the Jewish trope was first in evidence by 1983, 
when a petition was drawn up by Serbian Orthodox bishops, protesting Serbian 
persecution in Kosovo. This made the links between Serbian and Jewish suffering clear 
and drew what later became common parallels between Kosovo and Jerusalem:  
 
The Jewish people, before the menace of their annihilation and by the miracle of the 
uninterrupted memory, returned to Jerusalem after 2,000 years of suffering, against all 
logic of history. In a similar manner, the Serbian people have been fighting their battle at 
Kosovo since 1389, in order to save the memory of its identity, to preserve the meaning 
of their existence against all odds. (quoted in Yelen 1989, 132-133, my translation). 
 
By 1985, novelist and politician Vuk Drašković wrote his well known ‘Letter to the 
Writers of Israel’, in which he argued that ‘Serbs are the thirteenth, lost and the most ill-
fated tribe of Israel’ (Živković 2000, 236). Drašković would later link Serbia and Israel 
together, seeing both ‘liv[ing] in a hellish siege where the sworn goal is to seize and the 
cover with mosques or Vaticanize the lands of Moses and the people of St. Sava [Serbia’s 
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patron saint]’ (Cigar 1995, 236). Further parallels emerged from here. Kosovo would be 
compared to the Jewish legend of Masada, where approximately 1,000 Jewish warriors 
committed mass suicide, after a losing battle with the attacking Romans some 2,000 years 
ago (Levinsohn 1994, 16). Others saw ‘genetic’ similarities between both groups. Milan 
Bulajić, Director of the Museum of Victims of Genocide in Belgrade, located Serbian 
bravery and heroism in their ‘genes’, making them both ‘victims by destiny’ and ‘chosen 
people, like the Jews’ (Levinsohn 1994, 251). Žarko Korać of Belgrade University 
similarly promoted Serbs as a ‘heavenly people’ because of Kosovo, making it possible 
for them to ‘identify themselves with the Jews. As victims yes, but also with the idea of 
“sacred soil”’ (quoted in Judah 1997, 37). 
 
Rejecting the previous pro-Palestinian, anti-Zionist position of Tito’s Communist 
government (itself a co-founder of the Non-Aligned Movement), the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts drew up a controversial Memorandum in 1986—a long list of Serbian 
grievances against their treatment within the Federation. Much of the document dealt 
with the ‘genocide’ of Serbs in Kosovo, and articulated the need for Serbs throughout 
Yugoslavia to assert themselves collectively. The Memorandum’s architects would 
eventually play a prominent role in spurring nationalism, a highly controversial step for a 
seemingly impartial communist organisation (reprinted in Čovic 1993).  
 
Attempts by Serbian Party President Ivan Stambolić to deal with Kosovo’s civil unrest 
proved ineffective, and friction between Serbs and Albanians escalated (Denitch 1994, 
119-120). Slobodan Milošević, a former banker and bureaucrat, would ride on the 
coattails of nationalism by 1987, toppling his former mentor (Tanner 1997, 214). 
Milošević appealed to an emerging sense of Serbian unity, and claimed to speak for Serbs 
throughout Yugoslavia. Promising to end the persecution of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Kosovo, he advocated constitutional revision, a strengthening of the 
Orthodox Church and a privileging of Serbian cultural and social institutions, which he 
argued had long been repressed under Communism (Magaš 1993, 110; Cviic, 1993, 73). 
From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, almost 600,000 Kosovars, over half of the adult 
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population, would face arrest, interrogation, or police harassment (Seroka and Pavlović 
1992, 77; Thompson 1994, 128). 
 
For many, Serbian claims to Kosovo were no different from Zionist claims to Israel. 
Serbs were a persecuted nation, as were the Jews, and both deserved to have a national 
homeland because of past victimisation and future threats. This style of argumentation 
became all the more interesting when Kosovar Albanians likened themselves to 
Palestinians, suffering from similar troubles. Shkelsem Maliqi, for example, drew out a 
series of links between the two cases:  
 
Israel used all coercive means to ‘liberate’ and ‘redeem’ Palestine as a ‘sacred land’ 
which had been ‘usurped’ by the Palestinians. In the same way the dominant state 
machinery of the ‘unitary’ republic of Serbia decided to apply all coercive means to the 
task of bringing Kosova back into the national possession of the Serbs, on the grounds 
that Kosovo had been historically ‘sacred Serbian soil’, which had been ‘usurped’ by the 
Albanians a couple of centuries ago (Maliqi 1996, 142).2 
 
Maliqi posited that Serbian nationalists and militant Zionists had much in common:  
 
…the Serbs as a persecuted and historically tragic people, the notion of the historical right to 
gather all Serbs within one state, the idea of the crusade against (in this case) the Albanians as an 
alleged vanguard of Islamic fundamentalism, the right to recolonise ‘sacred soil’, the right to 
impose demographic control over the ‘usurpers’ (Maliqi 1996, 142).  
 
This is no doubt what the Serbs intended. If it was acceptable for one chosen people to 
take control of ancestral lands, then surely the Serbs could claim the same rights, if they 
too were chosen.  
 
Curiously, this dilemma was also apparent in Israel during the 1999 NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia. In America, Jewish groups largely sympathised with Kosovar Albanians. 
One organisation ran pictorial ads depicting trainloads of Albanians, reminiscent of Jews 
being shipped to the death camps. American Jews contributed to various relief funds and 
 
                                                 
2 For an Israeli commentary, see Igor Primoratz, ‘Israel and the war in the Balkans’, 
http://www.hr/darko/etf/isr2.html (Accessed 23 November, 2000). Primoratz argues that the pro-Serbian 
bias of the Israeli government had much to do with their own policies of expelling the Palestinians in 1948-
49. However, he draws the line at saying that Serbian actions and Israeli actions can be compared equally, 
since: ‘The crucial difference, of course, is the fact that “ethnic cleansing” was carried out in part by means 
of genocide.’  
 
Portal Vol. 2, No. 2 July 2005  14 
 
MacDonald  Globalizing the Holocaust 
Jewish agencies sent teams to the region to help reduce the refugee crisis (Plotz 1999). In 
Israel, the country’s top singers organized ‘Israel Must Help’, which raised money to help 
establish a hospital on Macedonia’s border with Kosovo (Andersson 1999).  
 
However, within Israel there was also a different view. Derfner, writing in The Jerusalem 
Post, noted a surprising ambivalence to the Serbian occupation of Kosovo. He cites a 
‘false perception’ in Israel, promoted by a ‘Serbian lobby’, that Serbs were completely 
pro-Jewish during the Holocaust, while the Croats were consumed with anti-Semitism. 
The reality, he argues, was substantively different. A further point of comparison 
concerns the belief that both Serbs and Israelis have been unfairly condemned as 
‘neighborhood bullies’. Haifa university professor Arnon Sofer has thus argued: ‘Many 
Israelis see the West interfering with the Serbs’ affairs out of ignorance and arrogance, 
just like they see the West interfering in Israel’ (Derfner 1999). The linkages between 
Kosovar Albanians and Palestinians were not lost in Israel, with some politicians seeing 
NATO airstrikes as a ‘dangerous precedent’. As well, Ariel Sharon (Israel’s Defence 
Minister at that time), used a nuanced approach to Kosovo as a means of courting the 
over 1 million new Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel. While not particularly pro-
Serbian, Russian Jews valued Sharon’s courting of Russia, which included three visits to 
the country in mid-1999 (Plotz, 1999). While most Israelis remained unconvinced of 
Serbian arguments, they found them attractive on some levels, no doubt encouraging 
Serbs to continue this rescripting of the Kosovo narrative. 
 
Croatia, Tudjman, and Serbophobia 
Serbian-Jewish connections also became important during the war in Croatia from 1991 
to 1995, with Croats seen as modern-day Nazis, bent on exterminating the Serbian 
people. Former Yugoslav general and historian Franjo Tudjman emerged as the head of 
the Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ), which by 
1990 became the primary nationalist force in the republic (Cigar 1995, 88). Tudjman’s 
party appeared western and progressive, but did practice some discrimination against the 
republic’s 12 percent Serbian population, leading to Serbian anger and eventually, violent 
protest (Cohen 1995, 18; Silber and Little 1993, 100-105). Conflict began in 1990 
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between Croatian Serbs and Croatian security forces, to which were added Serbian-
financed militia groups and later, the Yugoslav People’s Army (Silber and Little 1993, 
146-147). By September 1991, Serbian forces controlled almost one third of Croatian 
territory, and by October, had pushed southward to Dubrovnik (Silber and Little 1993, 
195-201). 
 
Serbia at this stage was reviled internationally as the aggressor, with Croats seen as 
hapless victims. As part and parcel of the Serbian strategy of playing the victim while 
invading other countries, the concept of ‘Serbophobia’ was introduced, denoting a 
historic fear, hatred, and jealousy of Serbs, often likened to anti-Semitism. Nationalist 
author and politician Dobrica Ćosić could thus claim: ‘We Serbs feel today as the Jews 
did in Hitler’s day.... Today, Serbophobia in Europe is a concept and an attitude with the 
same ideological motivation and fury as anti-Semitism had during the Nazi era’ (Ćosić 
1994, 44). For Smilja Avramov, (an advisor to Milošević): ‘The departure point for the 
genocide of the Jews was anti-Semitism, and of the Serbs, Serbophobia’ (Avramov 1992, 
18). Ćosić also saw Tudjman’s regime as an emerging Nazi dictatorship. He had this to 
say in a published collection of his wartime essays:  
 
We see in Croatia, many aspects of a Nazi resurrection. This state is governed by a 
totalitarian and chauvinistic regime, which has abolished the elementary civil and 
national rights of the Serbs by simply erasing them from its Constitution. This provoked a 
Serbian insurrection in Croatia, those who justly fear a new program of extermination, the 
same as the one during the Second World War to which they fell victim (Ćosić, 1994, 58-
59, my translation). 
 
Other writers urged Croatian Serbs not to surrender any weapons to the Croatian police, 
since politics had blossomed into ‘mass chauvinist hysteria’ (Vilić and Todorović 1996, 
14-15). World War II era mass graves were exhumed amid great display to hammer home 
the point (Bowman 1995, 56-57; Brčin 1991, 3-5). Even Croatian democracy was 
dismissed since ‘Hitler came to power in Germany within the framework of a multi-party 
mechanism but subsequently became a great dictator, aggressor and criminal’ (Ilić 1992, 
93). Others referred to ‘fascist state policy and kalashnikov democracy’ (Dakić 1994, 48).  
  
 
Serbophobia was developed in part to excuse land grabbing in Croatia and elsewhere. 
Past and future potential persecution was at the root of land claims outside of Serbia 
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proper. For Drašković, the true borders of Serbia were to be marked in the west by the 
Jadovno pits, the scenes of historic massacres of Serbs during World War II. These were 
to be ‘pits that must become sacred places’, while the eastern border was to be Kosovo, 
‘sacred places that must not become pits’ (Živković 2000, 72). Geographer Jovan Ilić 
would also use historic persecution as the basis for territorial claims. He claimed 
historical Serbian lands in Croatia for Serbia, but also claimed the Croatian city of 
Dubrovnik and several admittedly non-Serbian islands in the Adriatic as well. While Ilić 
could admit that ‘according to the ethnic principle this area [Dubrovnik] should belong to 
Croatia’, the new territorial arrangements were to be seen ‘primarily [as] a therapy for the 
treatment of ethno-psychic disorders … primarily among the Croatian population’ (Ilić 
1992, 98, 100-101). For Ilić, Serbs had an ‘additional right to self-determination and 
uniting’, because of their exposure to ‘genocidal extermination many times’ (Ilić 1992, 
31). A mixture of compensation and punishment for past crimes were often held to be at 
the root of Serbian claims to Croatia. 
 
World War II era Serbophobia and Jasenovac 
Serbophobia would reach its apogee during World War II, when in 1941, Yugoslavia was 
invaded by the Italian and German allies, and split into different spheres of influence. 40 
percent of Yugoslav territory was given over to a Croatian (Fascist) Ustasha controlled 
Independent State of Croatia (or Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) (Pawlovich 2002, 
139-141). In representations of World War II, Croats were lumped together with German 
Nazis as genocidal killers, Serbs and Jews as fellow victims of genocide (Serbian 
National Defence Council of America 1993, 28-30; Petrović 1991). According to Milan 
Bulajić et al’s Never Again, the Ustaša regime killed 30,000 of Croatia’s Jews during the 
war, as well as a majority of the Gypsy community (Bulajić, Miletić and Lukić 1991, 2). 
These numbers are roughly born out by more impartial historians (Goldstein 1999, 135, 
158; Lebor 2002, 332). 
  
Avramov refers to a united ‘Jewish-Serbian-Capitalist-Democratic front’ that ‘had to 
disappear forever from the world ... Jews and Serbs were struck with the same dagger.’ 
(Goldstein 1999, 32). For Drašković: ‘Jewish-Serbian martyrdom was sealed and signed 
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in blood’. Both, after all, were ‘exterminated at the same concentration camps, 
slaughtered at the same bridges, burned alive in the same ovens, thrown together in the 
same pits’(Živković 2000, 69-73). Ćosić went so far as to assert that the genocide of 
Serbs was worse than that of the Jews, in terms of its methods and bestiality (Ćosić 1994, 
24). Thus Yugoslavia’s dominant and largest ethnic group lumped themselves with one of 
the smallest and weakest minorities as fellow victims of Fascist terror. Two very unlike 
peoples became one.  
 
In Serbian eyes, the Catholic Church in Croatia was instrumental in bringing about a 
Serbian genocide, with the Church featuring as a strong supporter of ‘policies of 
clericalism and racism, marked by mass killings, forced conversions and the deportation 
of the Serbian Orthodox population as well the slaughter of the Jews and Gypsies’ 
(Bataković 1997). For others, the Ustaša state was ‘soundly and joyously received by the 
majority of the Croatian people’, while Church leaders were ‘the most loyal [of] Hitler’s 
collaborator[s]’ (Ilić 1995b, 330). 
  
Embodying Ustaša crimes was the Croatian-run death camp Jasenovac. Serbian historians 
have called it ‘the dark secret of the Holocaust’ and ‘the suppressed chapter of Holocaust 
history.’(www.jasenovac.org). During the Milošević era, The SUC (Serbian Unity 
Congress) would claim Jasenovac as ‘the third largest concentration camp of the WW II 
occupied Europe’ (Serbian Unity Congress 1996). The Serbian Ministry of Information 
also depicted Jasenovac as a Serbian ‘holocaust’ (Serbian Ministry of Information). 
Imagery of a violent, annihilatory Croatian other proved central in motivating the Serbs 
to ‘defend’ the Serbian minorities in Tudjman’s Croatia. It was not only Jasenovac, but 
also the covering up of the genocide after 1945 that captured the imagination of Serbian 
writers. Slobodan Kljakić’s Conspiracy of Silence traced a Communist conspiracy to 
lower the number of Serbian dead, a project propelled in part by the Vatican (Kljakić 
1991, 23). Tudjman’s revisionist writings were also frequently attacked for their 
continued ’Ustaša clerico-nationalism’ and ‘a certain form of clerical Nazism’ (Bulajić 
1994, 13-14; Bulajić 1993, 23). 
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The numbers of Serbs killed at Jasenovac was a frequent subject of scholarly debate, with 
numbers ranging (on the Serbian side) from 700,000 to 2 million casualties (Ilic 1995b, 
333; Đurđević 1995, 15; Nouvel Observateur et Raporteurs sans Frontières 1993, 277; 
Bataković 1992; Zečević 2000, 7; Kontić 1995, 2; Pavlovich 1988, 226; Damjanov 1995, 
6; Avramov 1992, 170; Anzulović 1994, 103-104). Revisionist novels and scholarly 
works were also designed to maintain or increase the Communist estimate of Serbian 
deaths. Some of these include Strahinja Kurdulija’s Serbs on Their Own Land (1993)3 
and Lazo Kostić’s The Holocaust in the Independent State of Croatia (1981), reprinted by 
the Serbian government. Such books, as well as shorter surveys by Serbian academics, 
perpetuated a high number of deaths, continuing the theme that Serbs were victims of the 
worst genocide in World War II, with only the Jews and the Russians ahead of them. 
Even after the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Serbian interest in Jasenovac continued. In the 
context of escalating tensions in Kosovo in 1998, Diaspora Serbs formed a ‘Jasenovac 
Research Institute’, designed to promote the ‘Serbian Holocaust’ in North America 
(Jasenovac Research Institute http://www.jasenovac.org/index.asp).  
 
The Serbian Jewish Friendship Society and Tudjman’s Croatia 
In 1988, a group of Serbian intellectuals formed the Serbian-Jewish Friendship Society 
(SJFS), in the hope of paralleling the plight of Serbs and Jews. The SJFS was headed by 
Klara Mandić, a Jewish dentist who lost 73 members of her family in the Holocaust. A 
charismatic character with long red fingernails and two gold stars of David around her 
neck, Mandić gained increasing fame, as connections between Serbs and Jews were 
increasingly drawn by nationalist intellectuals (Lebor 2002, 331). The SJFS was in large 
measure affiliated with the government. It had the backing of both Milošević and Bosnian 
Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, who was even rumoured to be Mandić’s lover (331). 
 
The primary goal of the SJFS was to strengthen contact between Serbia and Israel, 
relations which had soured during the Communist era. Activities such as city twinning 
were popular, with 22 twin cities between Serbia and Israel, where mutual activities, from 
 
                                                 
3 See a synopsis of this at the Serbian Unity Congress Website 
http://suc.Suc.Org/~kosta/tar/knjige/atlas/index.html (Accessed 18 June, 1999). 
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sporting events to commercial transactions were encouraged. Mandić brought the mayors 
of fifteen Serbian cities to Israel during the Gulf War, while Serbian Crown Prince in 
exile Aleksander visited Israel (Cohen 1996, 117). Other activities included a ‘Serbia 
Week’ in Israel, with much help from Dušan Mihajlović, the future Serbian Minister of 
Internal Affairs (Biserko).  
 
At its height, the SJFS would claim more than 5,000 members worldwide, with American 
chapters in Chicago, New York and Los Angeles. The majority of members were in 
Yugoslavia, primarily in Belgrade (Yearwood 1999). Mandić was well known for her 
glowing portrayals of the Serbian people, and her constant invocation of their kindness 
and tolerance to Jews: ‘You are really one of the rare people of the world which can be 
counted on the fingers of one hand, a people that simply does not know how to hate’ 
(Mandić 1993). In token of this philosemitic ideal, Belgrade dedicated its first public 
Holocaust memorial in 1990; created by Jewish sculptor Nandor Glid (Gruber 2003). 
North of Belgrade, in Zemun, the supposed ancestral home of Theodor Herzl was 
restored and turned into a museum, to show the historic ‘Jewishness’ of Serbia 
(Levinsohn 1994, 199). SANU contributed by issuing two editions of Predrag 
Palavestra’s Jewish Writers in Serbian Literature, which featured the work of 67 Jewish 
writers based in Belgrade. As the Ministry of Information argued, the book was designed 
to stress that ‘the Jewish challenge to all the Christians in the world, especially to the 
Orthodox Serbs, should be strengthening of one’s own religious and national identity, a 
call to Serbs to be united, in order for them, just like the Jews, to preserve, strengthen and 
justify their existence in the world.’ Jews were to be a crucial inspiration for how Serbs 
should see themselves (Serbia Info News, 12 February 1999). 
 
By 1992, Mandić and her colleagues went on a lecture tour of the United States, 
drumming up support for the Serbs while demonising the Croats for their supposed anti-
Semitism. The SJFS, together with other groups such as the Serbian Unity Congress and 
Serbnet began actively trying to co-opt Jewish public opinion in the United States. As 
with Mandić’s strategy, this involved primarily demonizing Croats as Ustaša supporters, 
while highlighting some Bosnian Moslems’ support for the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a 
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Nazi ally during World War II (Gruber 2003; Blitz 1994). The key here was to 
demonstrate to Jews that Serbs had saved Jews during World War II, unlike other groups. 
The SJFS would promote awareness ‘of the living historical memory about genocides 
committed to Serbs and Jews since Medieval Ages till nowadays, especially during 
World War II…’ (‘Appeal By the Serbian-Jewish Friendship Society of Belgrade’ 1999). 
Their work also included highlighting Croatia’s anti-Semitism, including charges that 
Croatian Jews feared for their lives from the authorities.4 
 
Laslo Sekelj, in a study prepared for the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study 
of Anti-Semitism, noted the increased ‘functionalization’ of Jews taking place through 
the work of the SJFS: ‘the use of Jews, Jewish symbols, and the Holocaust for political 
manipulation’. Sekelj notes the overtly political nature of the SJFS, specifically how an 
‘enormous quantity of public statements were made in support of Karadzic and Serb 
paramilitary groups in Bosnia and Croatia … [e]specially in attempts to legitimize 
Serbian ethno-nationalism …’. In reality, the SJFS enjoyed little support amongst Jewish 
groups and indeed, were instrumental in harassing anyone critical of Serbian nationalism, 
including some Jewish intellectuals (Sekelj 1997). Some Jewish leaders did promote such 
pro-Serbian policies, even seeing ‘Serbophobia as a twin sister of anti-Semitism’, with 
others calling America ‘a monster of this earth’. However, some coercion on the part of 
the government seems to have taken place.5 
 
 
                                                
Serbian plans, argues Živković, were naïve—to curry Israeli support for the ‘reconquest 
of Kosovo’, while petitioning the ‘American Jewish lobby’ to help their cause (Živković, 
 
4 ‘Excerpts from the ‘War Raises Old Anxieties for Croatian Jews.’ Including statement by the slain Jewish 
leader, Klara Mandić From: London 'Independent,' 21 October, 1991’ http://emperors-
clothes.com/cos/usefula2.htm; Such accusations would later be countered by the president of the Zagreb 
Jewish Community Nenad Porges, who, in turn, accused the Serbs of anti-Semitism and expressed support 
for the Croatian government. See Ruth Gruber, ‘Our Yugoslavia’ (1 June, 2003, Our Jerusalem).  
http://www.ourjerusalem.com/history/story/history20030601.html. 
5 Other Jewish leaders were also co-opted into service. In 1995 during the NATO bombing of Bosnia, 
Danon Cadik, Chief Rabbi of Yugoslavia, issued an ‘Open letter to the American Jewish Committee’ 
urging American Jews to stop the campaign. Cadik would blame the bombing on ‘unrestrained anti-Serbian 
propaganda, raging during all this war, following the Nazi model, but much more efficient means and in a 
much more sophisticated and more expensive way.’ Danon Cadik, Chief Rabbi of Yugoslavia, et. al., 
‘Open letter to the American Jewish Committee’ (1995) http://emperors-
clothes.com/articles/danon/YugoRabb.html For further claims of Jewish support, see Serbia Info News, 
‘Rabbi Asiel: deep sorrow for our fatherland’ (Belgrade: Ministry of Information, April 05, 1999) 
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2000, 74). In neither cause were they particularly successful. The Society fell from favour 
as the Milošević regime dragged on, and in 2001, Mandić was murdered in her apartment 
in Belgrade under mysterious circumstances (Lebor 2002, 336).  
 
Kosovo II: 1999 
In March 1999, NATO began bombing Yugoslavia in Operation Allied Force, designed 
to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbian militia units linked to the 
Milošević regime (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 101). The Operation lasted 78 days, 
culminating in the destruction of most of Yugoslavia’s military and much of its civilian 
infrastructure (Greenberg 2000, 212; Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 143-144, 209). In the 
context of this air campaign, the need to stress Serbian-Jewish linkages increased. Among 
some Diaspora groups, there was palpable anger against Jews for being at the root of 
NATO attacks.  
 
Claims of Jews ‘owing’ the Serbs for their goodness in World War II emerged in SJFS 
rhetoric during this time, reinforcing Jewish duplicity. Thus Heather Cottin’s position a 
month after Allied Force began:  
 
Today is Yom Hashoah. Today, the little nation of Yugoslavia is being bombed in a blitzkrieg 
more deadly then any the Nazis ever leveled at any nation in World War II. The Serbs, who were 
the only friends Jews had in Yugoslavia during World War II, have been demonized and accused 
of genocide (Cottin 1999). 
 
Cottin went on to question why a ‘false analogy’ had arisen between Jews and Kosovar 
Albanians, concluding that a ‘terrible manipulation’ had been perpetrated by the media 
and the American government (‘Borba’ 15 August 1999). Similarly, Ljubomir Tadić, 
president of SANU and member of the SJFS board claimed Serbs as ‘victims of 
monstrous lies and accusations. The inflamed Serbophobia is a new, modern form of Nazi 
racism’ (Yearwood 1999). 
 
A year after the Kosovo campaign, William Dorich would angrily accuse the World 
Jewish Congress of having ‘set the stage for public relations sponsored Serbophobia 
throughout the 1990s.’ He further added, accusing Jews of ingratitude:  
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Serbs can’t count on the Jews to be honest anti-genocide brokers when they have never lifted a 
voice to recognize the thousands of Serbs who share common graves with Jews because those 
Serbs were caught hiding their Jewish neighbors in their attics, barns and basement during the 
Holocaust (Dorich 2000).  
 
The ‘SACRU Serbian-American Civil Rights Unlimited Documenting Jewish Genocides 
on Serbs’ would outline a bizarre conspiracy during the conflict, blaming the ‘Jewish 
Institute for National Security Affairs’ for US aggression against the Serbs. The ten year 
history of the conflict, from 1989 to 1999 is encapsulated in the actions of various US 
leaders, journalists and lobbyists, labeled as ‘Jew’, who are seen to be at the root of 
American intervention in Yugoslavia (‘SACRU Serbain-American Civil Rights 
Unlimited Documenting Jewish Genocides On Serbs’, 
http://www.compuserb.com/sacru/) 
 
Sekelj does note the rise of anti-Semitism in Serbia during the 1990s, as people looked 
for someone to blame. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion were reprinted on several 
occasions, while various academics outlined Jewish conspiracies, tying Jews and Masons 
together. Russian recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was also traced to ‘the Jewish 
lobby in the highest echelons of Russian diplomacy.’ At the same time, the anti-Semitic 
works of Ratibor Đurđević and Orthodox Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović were warmly 
received in some quarters, while rejected in others (Sekelj 1997). 
 
However, despite works by Ljubica Stefan and Philip J Cohen (Stefan 1993; Cohen 1997) 
averring the deep anti-Semitism of the Serbian people, Sekelj sees a relatively low level 
of anti-Semitism in Yugoslavia: 20.8 percent in Serbia (excluding Kosovo), and 15 
percent in Montenegro. He thus argues: ‘Anti-Semitism was not of major importance in 
the former Yugoslavia, unlike the case of Poland, the former Soviet Union, Hungary, 
Romania, and Slovakia’ (Sekelj 1997) Živković (himself a Serbian Jew) similarly argues 
that he has not experienced any anti-Semitism in his own country (Živković 2000, 80). 
 
Conclusions: The Holocaust and Classicalism 
As I have tried to demonstrate, the Jewish trope in Serbian nationalism became a central 
facet of national identity in the 1980s and 90s, particularly when conflicts in Kosovo, 
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Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina began. If nationalism in this case was formed by 
negative, foreign myths, must we substantially alter Smith’s understanding of national 
identity and the role of the golden age? How would a Smithean analysis respond to the 
above criticism? I would argue that there are aspects of Smith’s work which can be used 
to understand the Holocaust’s role in nationalist mythology. This may involve going back 
to his ideas of classicalism as a framework for presenting national history. The Holocaust 
needs to be interpreted as a new frame of reference, a new form of negative classicalism. 
As Britain, America and other countries imitated the ancient Greeks and Romans in their 
presentation of the nation, so too has Serbia now used a foreign frame of reference to 
elevate itself, even if it does not harken back to a pristine, classical époque (Smith 1998; 
Smith 1996a, 199).  
 
In his work on the growing importance of the Holocaust in national identity, Furedi 
argues that the time of positive golden ages has passed. Over the past two hundred years, 
myths stressing the ‘unique greatness of a particular people or culture’ have been 
privileged, especially those promoting ‘heroic deeds and glorious events’. Such myths 
were designed to ‘construct a positive vision of the future’. However, modern re-
presentations of history are ‘driven by a very different impulse’—acting as a ‘monument 
to people’s historic suffering’. The Jewish Holocaust emerges as ‘the icon for therapeutic 
history’, and ‘[t]he language associated with Holocaust discourse—particularly the 
imager of the traumatised survivor—has been appropriated by numerous activists 
determined to state a claim to the status associated with emotional suffering’.(Furedi 
2002). 
 
At a purely practical and pragmatic level, manipulating Holocaust imagery did ultimately 
accomplish three main goals. Domestically, it rallied the people together in a time of 
escalating tensions and hostilities, convincing people that genocide might well be around 
the corner. ‘Defensive’ ethnic cleansing could thus be promoted as a means of saving 
members of the nation from annihilation. Targeting external enemies using such vitriolic 
language underpinned the Milošević regime and allowed violent ultra-nationalism to 
come to the fore.  
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Internationally, the barrage of Holocaust imagery from all sides served to confuse and 
obscure the true identities of the perpetrators. Yes, most knew that the Serbs had 
committed the lion’s share of atrocities, with the Croats in second place. Yet the frequent 
rhetorical attacks and claims of persecution from Serbs, Croats, Kosovar Albanians and 
Bosnian Moslems served to reinforce the idea that everyone was fighting everyone else, 
and that the conflicts had ancient roots that could not simply be resolved by cursory 
negotiations or even air strikes. Inaction could thus be excused. Former American 
Ambassador Lawrence Eagleberger’s comments were typical in this regard: ‘Until the 
Bosnians, Serbs and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside 
world can do about it’. (quoted in Holbrooke 1998, 23). 
 
A third goal concerned the Jewish people themselves, domestically in the rump of 
Yugoslavia, as well as in America and in Israel. Such imagery was targeted to gain 
Jewish sympathy and support for the Serbian cause. It did work in Israel to some extent, 
as discussed previously. Negative imagery against Croatia was also designed to reduce 
Israeli and American support for this breakaway republic. This was also effective to some 
extent, although Tudjman’s writings and speeches did more to alienate the Israelis than 
any Serbian undertaking.   
 
In these ways, Holocaust imagery served the Serbian nation in time of war, although it 
took an obvious destructive toll on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Whether 
such a framework for analysing history will be useful in times of peace is debatable. I 
would argue that in the post-Milošević era, such imagery has become less welcome and 
less interesting for those struggling to overcome a decade of crippling sanctions, 
worldwide condemnation, violence, and corruption.  
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